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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action was commenced by the State of Utah 
to condemn certain property for This Is The Place 
Monument Park. The direction of the Legislature in this 
respect was positive and the language of the statute 
1 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
dealt not only with the end result but also with procedure 
and is worthy of quotation, as follows : 
There is appropriated out of the emergency relief 
fund to the Engineering Commission the sum of 
three hundred thousand dollars to pay the amount 
of the judgment or judgments, costs, appraisal 
fees and other expenses incident to the condemn-
ing and acquisition of the lands referred to in 
Section 8 hereof. The amount to be expended 
under this appropriation shall not exceed the 
amount awarded by the court as judgment or 
judgments and costs and the expenses in the pro-
ceedings to be instituted for the condemning of 
said lands. I t is further expressly provided that 
in the event the said judgment or judgments, costs 
and expenses shall exceed the amount of three 
hundred thousand dollars the State Board of 
Examiners shall allocate out of the reserve build-
ing fund to the Engineering Commission such 
additional amount as may be necessary to pay 
said judgment or judgments, costs, appraisal fees 
and expenses incident thereto. Provided further 
that any owners of any part or all of the land 
described in Section 8 hereof, may on or before 
July 15, 1951 submit in writing an offer to sell 
said land to the State of Utah to said Engineering 
Commission, together with warranty deed and 
Abstract of Title or suitable title insurance to 
said property. If said offer is approved by said 
Commission within 20 days after receipt thereof, 
the same shall be presented to the State Board 
of Examiners by said Commission for their con-
sideration. If approved by said Board of Ex-
aminers, the same shall be purchased by said 
Engineering Commission and paid for upon ap-
proval of title, the same as herein provided, for 
satisfaction of judgment of condemnation. Other-
wise, said deed and abstract shall be returned to 
2 
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said offeror and the property condemned as 
herein provided. The Engineering Commission 
shall not delay the institution and prosecution of 
said action to condemn on account of the fore-
going provision, but shall dismiss said action as 
against any property purchased by the State 
pursuant to its provisions. Laws of Utah, 1951, 
First Special Session, Chapter 13, Section 2. 
All of the property within the area has been secured 
by the State of Utah and payment made therefor except 
that belonging to the respondents here; but it is notable 
that the property of these respondents comprises the 
major portion of the property ordered condemned by 
the Legislature (Ex. 1). 
This condemnation proceeding was commenced in 
accord with the above statute and summonses were 
served and the effective date for the determination of 
damage became July 12, 1951, which date appears often 
in the record as the date upon which the appraisers 
estimated the damage suffered by the owners of the 
property involved. 
It should be here noted that this action was tried to 
a jury in May of 1952 and a judgment rendered in favor 
of the respondents and that that judgment in the sum 
of $495,986.40 has been paid to the respondents (K. 43). 
An appeal was taken by the Deere estate and resulted 
in this Court granting a new trial upon the question of 
damages only. The opinion of this Court is reported as 
the case of State v. Peek, 1 U. 2d 2 $ , 265 P. 2d 630. The 
present appeal is by the State from a jury verdict and 
3 
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a judgment thereon in the total additional sum of 
$192,821.19 (R. 96-99). 
The property of the respondent as shown by Exhibit 
1 consists of all of the property within the park area 
except that portion shown in white on the map, (Exhibit 
1) and by the pretrial order of the District Court was 
divided into eight parcels for convenience in presenting 
the case to the jury. These eight parcels are marked on 
Exhibit 1 and are given separate colors. Prior to the 
trial, counsel for the State of Utah and for the re-
spondents, Deere Estate, agreed as to the values that 
could be placed on five of these parcels, but, as to Parcels 
1, 2 and 3 and the value to be placed on the water dis-
tribution system, the appraisers were not in agreement 
and it was this phase of the case that was submitted to 
the jury. I t might be pointed out here that the statute 
authorizing and directing this condemnation proceeding 
in effect permitted settlement of values with the various 
owners only if the owner agreed with the figures and 
amounts determined upon by the state appraisers; and 
it should be here noted that the amount agreed upon as 
to values for Parcels 4 to 8, both inclusive, were the 
figures of the state appraisers. 
I t also appears proper to note that the major dif-
ference in values between the parties concerns Parcel 1 
and the water distribution system and that, as to Parcel 
1, the difference lies in the approach made by the ap-
praisers to this problem of value. This difference in 
approach is particularly apparent in the testimony of 
4 
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the respondent's witness, Ealph Wright, commencing on 
page 191 of the record in this case and continuing 
through page 204 of the record. This difference is again 
reflected in the testimony of H. Mervin Wallace, a witness 
for respondent, from page 261 through page 267 of the 
record, and again in the testimony of respondent's wit-
ness, Joseph Benedict, at pages 296 through 299 of the 
record. 
Again, with respect to Parcel 1, the three appraisers 
for the Deere Estate all arrived at a figure of value 
slightly in excess of $300,000.00; the witnesses for the 
State of Utah values this same property at three dif- . 
ferent amounts, namely $163,250.00, $148,883.00, a n d ^ 7 ^ 
$169,000.00. The record is clear that the approach used / 
by the two sets of appraisers was entirely different and 
this approach caused this disparity in the amounts. The £}uM^A^ 
appraisers for the respondent took each lot within this - ^ • 
area as a separate parcel of land, valued it as such on / / • ~~ 
the basis of a retail sale to the ultimate home builder f r^ 
and gave no allowance or consideration to any of t h e y 7 ^ * ^ 
costs involved, to the time element or to the profit for ~%£**«> 
the risk to the owner buyer. The appraisers for the ***4*/*^**K 
State considered these items and based their appraisal % cc&4#* 
upon the market value of the entire tract as one parcel 
in accordance with the pretrial order of the District 
Court. 
The witness, Edward M. Ashton, testifying for the 
State, said: 
"Ordinarily, the profits on a real estate subdivi-
sion is the last end of it. Many of them are 
5 
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extended over many years, and I would say, as a 
rule of practice, the last twenty-five percent of 
the lots is that portion of the deal that is the 
profit." (E. 420). 
This evidence is not contradicted and is again em-
phasized by the testimony of each of the appraisers to 
the effect that the subdivision business is one full of 
risks that the owner must take. 
The jury in this case returned a verdict of $82,927.00 
for the water works and water rights owned by the re-
spondents in connection with the Oakhills development 
(E. 93). The evidence as to water and its value was 
confined to the testimony of the witness, C. J. Ullrich, 
and the witness, Dean F. Brayton. The witness, Ullrich, 
testified as to the value of the water right itself and 
placed a value of $16,500.00 on it (E. 312). The State 
does not contend that this was improper and we recog-
nize that the appellants are entitled to recover for this 
water right reduced by the amount sold to Wheelwright 
as testified to by Mr. Brayton (E. 320). This places a 
net value of $11,290.00 on the water right. 
However, the witness, Ullrich, placed a value of 
$57,200 on the water works (E. 313) and $19,700.00 on 
the distribution system (E. 314). There was no evidence 
as to how this water works and water system could be 
otherwise used except as given by the witness, Ullrich 
(E. 311), where he stated that the water collection and 
transmission system had no use at the time of the con-
demnation except to serve the area condemned but that 
it could be adapted to other uses. The evidence as to 
6 
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this adaptation and the cost thereof was entirely lacking, 
yet the evidence of value was placed before the jury over 
the objection of the State. 
And, in addition, Mr. Brayton, over the objection 
of the State, was permitted to testify as to the cost of 
the water distribution system (R. 317-321), and Exhibit 
39 was introduced, over the State's objection, showing 
these detailed costs, which included an item of ten per-
cent increase in cost which admittedly was never paid 
or incurred by the respondents (R. 328-330). 
The respondent's appraisers each testified that their 
valuation of the lots within Parcel 1 were based upon 
the utilities present or absent and each specifically stated 
that the presence of the water distribution system was 
reflected in their figures and its absence would have re-
sulted in a lowering of their figures (R. 231, R, 261, and 
R. 296). Based upon this, the State moved to strike all 
of the evidence as to this water distribution and trans-
mission system and this motion was denied (R. 332). 
We have endeavored in this statement of facts to 
cover the general picture and wTe have purposely omitted 
any reference to the instructions given or the failure 
to give certain instructions as it is necessary to fully 
discuss them in the argument following. We have in a 
few other instances omitted in this statement of facts 
matters that might properly be there but they again 
appear necessary to fully state in the argument. This 
brief is rather long and it is our desire to avoid repeti-
tion where it is possible to do so. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THAT THE TRIAL COUET IMPROPEELY HELD 
AND INSTRUCTED THE JUEY THAT THE RE-
SPONDENTS WEEE ENTITLED TO EECOVEE 
DAMAGES UPON SIXTY-TWO SEPAEATE LOTS 
WITHIN PAECEL 1, EACH TO BE SEPAEATELY 
VALUED AND THEN TOTALLED FOE THE PUR-
POSE OF ASSESSING DAMAGE AS TO PAECEL 1; 
AND EEEOE IS PEEDICATED UPON EACH OF 
THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC POINTS IN THIS 
CONNECTION: 
(A) THAT THIS ACTION OF THE TEIAL 
COURT WAS IN DIRECT CONTRADICTION 
TO THE PRETRIAL ORDER OF THE COURT. 
(B) THAT THE COUET IMPEOPEELY GAVE 
INSTRUCTION NO. 9 AND INSTRUCTED THE 
JURY IN EFFECT THAT THEY WERE TO 
DISREGARD THE EVIDENCE OF PLAIN-
TIFF'S WITNESSES, AND ALSO THAT SAID 
INSTRUCTION PERMITS THE JURY TO 
ASSESS AS A PART OF VALUE FUTURE 
PROFITS NOT YET EARNED AND HIGHLY 
SPECULATIVE. 
(C) THAT THE COURT IMPROPERLY GAVE 
INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 12 AND 13; THAT SAID 
INSTRUCTIONS IN EFFECT PERMITTED 
THE JUEY TO ASSESS AS VALUE THE RE-
TAIL PRICE OF THE INDIVIDUAL LOTS IN 
PARCEL 1. 
(D) THAT THE COURT IMPROPERLY GAVE 
INSTRUCTION NO. 17 IN THAT AGAIN THE 
PURPORT OF SAID INSTRUCTION GIVES TO 
THE DEFENDANTS A FUTURE PROFIT 
8 
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HIGHLY SPECULATIVE AND NOT YET 
EARNED; AND THE EFFECT OF SAID IN-
STRUCTION IS TO UNDERWRITE AN UN-
EARNED PROFIT FOR THE DEFENDANTS. 
(E) THAT THE COURT IMPROPERLY RE-
FUSED TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 10, 11 AND 12; THAT 
SAID INSTRUCTIONS CORRECTLY STATE 
THE LAW APPLICABLE TO CONDEMNATION 
AND FAILURE TO GIVE SAID INSTRUC-
TIONS PERMITTED THE JURY TO ASSESS 
DAMAGES ON THE BASIS OF 60 ODD INDI-
VIDUAL PARCELS IN PARCEL 1 RATHER 
THAN ONE PARCEL. 
(F) THAT THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY 
DENIED THE MOTION OF APPELLANT TO 
STRIKE THE TESTIMONY OF THE WITNES-
SES, RALPH WRIGHT, D. MERVIN WALLACE 
AND JOSEPH BENEDICT, AS TO VALUATION 
OF PARCEL 1. 
(G) THAT THE COURT IMPROPERLY GAVE 
INSTRUCTION NO. 10 AS SAID INSTRUCTION 
DOES NOT CORRECTLY DEFINE A WILLING 
S E L I J E R . 
(H) THAT THE COURT IMPROPERLY RE-
FUSED TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 5 AND THAT SAID IN-
STRUCTION CORRECTLY STATES THE LAW 
AS IT CONCERNS A WILLING SELLER. 
POINT II. 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY PER-
MITTED THE JURY TO CONSIDER AND TO 
ASSESS DAMAGES TO THE WATER DISTRIBU-
TION SYSTEM IN THE FOLLOWING PARTICU-
LARS: 
9 
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(A) THE COURT IMPROPERLY PERMITTED 
THE WITNESS, ULLRICH, TO TESTIFY AS 
TO VALUES OF THE WATER DISTRIBUTION 
AND TRANSMISSION SYSTEM. 
(B) THE COURT IMPROPERLY RECEIVED 
EXHIBIT 39D PERTAINING TO VALUES OF 
THE WATER DISTRIBUTION AND TRANS-
MISSION SYSTEM. 
(C) THAT THE COURT IMPROPERLY DE-
NIED THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE 
THE EVIDENCE OF THE WITNESSES, BRAY-
TON AND ULLRICH AS TO VALUES OF THE 
WATER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM AND 
TRANSMISSION SYSTEM. 
(D) THAT THE COURT IMPROPERLY RE-
FUSED TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 19. 
(E) THAT THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY 
PERMITTED THE WITNESS BRAYTON TO 
TESTIFY AS TO VALUES AS HE WAS 
NEITHER AN EXPERT NOR AN OWNER. 
POINT III. 
THAT THE COURT IMPROPERLY LIMITED THE 
PLAINTIFF AS TO THE EVIDENCE PROFFERED 
BY AND PROPOSED TO BE GIVEN BY THE WIT-
NESSES, SOLOMON AND ASHTON. 
POINT IV. 
THAT THE COURT IMPROPERLY GAVE IN-
STRUCTION NO. 15 AND PERMITTED THE JURY 
TO ASSESS AS VALUE THE STREETS WITHIN 
THE PROPERTY; THAT THE COURT IMPROP-
ERLY REFUSED TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S RE-
10 
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QUESTED INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 14 AND 15 AS TO 
OWNERSHIP OF PLATTED STREETS. 
POINT V. 
THAT THE COURT GAVE NO INSTRUCTION AS 
TO BURDEN OF PROOF AND IMPROPERLY RE-
FUSED TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED IN-
STRUCTION NO. 2 DEALING THEREWITH. 
POINT VI. 
THAT THE COURT IMPROPERLY ASSESSED IN-
TEREST AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF IN COMPUT-
ING THE AMOUNT OF THE JUDGMENT EN-
TERED ON THE VERDICT ON NOVEMBER 5, 1954. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY HELD 
AND INSTRUCTED THE JURY THAT THE RE-
SPONDENTS WERE ENTITLED TO RECOVER 
DAMAGES UPON SIXTY-TWO SEPARATE LOTS 
WITHIN PARCEL 1, EACH TO BE SEPARATELY 
VALUED AND THEN TOTALLED FOR THE PUR-
POSE OF ASSESSING DAMAGE AS TO PARCEL 1; 
AND ERROR IS PREDICATED UPON EACH OF 
THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC POINTS IN THIS 
CONNECTION: 
(A) THAT THIS ACTION OF THE TRIAL 
COURT WAS IN DIRECT CONTRADICTION 
TO THE PRETRIAL ORDER OF THE COURT. 
(B) THAT THE COURT IMPROPERLY GAVE 
INSTRUCTION NO. 9 AND INSTRUCTED THE 
JURY IN EFFECT THAT THEY WERE TO 
11 
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DISREGARD THE EVIDENCE OF PLAIN-
TIFF'S WITNESSES, AND ALSO THAT SAID 
INSTRUCTION PERMITS THE JURY TO 
ASSESS AS A PART OF VALUE FUTURE 
PROFITS NOT YET EARNED AND HIGHLY 
SPECULATIVE. 
(C) THAT THE COURT IMPROPERLY GAVE 
INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 12 AND 13; THAT SAID 
INSTRUCTIONS IN EFFECT PERMITTED 
THE JURY TO ASSESS AS VALUE THE RE-
TAIL PRICE OF THE INDIVIDUAL LOTS IN 
PARCEL 1. 
(D) THAT THE COURT IMPROPERLY GAVE 
INSTRUCTION NO. 17 IN THAT AGAIN THE 
PURPORT OF SAID INSTRUCTION GIVES TO 
THE DEFENDANTS A FUTURE PROFIT 
HIGHLY SPECULATIVE AND NOT YET 
EARNED; AND THE EFFECT OF SAID IN-
STRUCTION IS TO UNDERWRITE AN UN-
EARNED PROFIT FOR THE DEFENDANTS. 
(E) THAT THE COURT IMPROPERLY RE-
FUSED TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 10, 11 AND 12; THAT 
SAID INSTRUCTIONS CORRECTLY STATE 
THE LAW APPLICABLE TO CONDEMNATION 
AND FAILURE TO GIVE SAID INSTRUC-
TIONS PERMITTED THE JURY TO ASSESS 
DAMAGES ON THE BASIS OF 60 ODD INDI-
VIDUAL PARCELS IN PARCEL 1 RATHER 
THAN ONE PARCEL. 
(F) THAT THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY 
DENIED THE MOTION OF APPELLANT TO 
STRIKE THE TESTIMONY OF THE WITNES-
SES, RALPH WRIGHT, D. MERVIN WALLACE 
AND JOSEPH BENEDICT, AS TO VALUATION 
OF PARCEL 1. 
12 
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(G) THAT THE COUET IMPEOPEELY GAVE 
INSTEXJCTION NO. 10 AS SAID INSTEUCTION 
DOES NOT COEEECTLY DEFINE A WILLING 
SELLEE. 
(H) THAT THE COUET IMPEOPEELY EE-
FITSED TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S BEQUESTED 
INSTEUCTION NO. 5 AND THAT SAID IN-
STEUCTION COEEECTLY STATES THE LAW 
AS IT CONCEENS A WILLING SELLEE. 
We have set forth in the statement of points under 
Point I eight subparagraphs each dealing with a specific 
issue before the trial court wherein we maintain that 
error was committed. However, the applicable lawT would 
indicate that all eight should be combined for the purpose 
of argument. The specific issue can be rather briefly 
stated in two parts: First, is the respondent entitled to 
a valuation of its property based upon a mere mathe-
matical total of the appraised retail value of each of 
sixty-two separate building lots, or must the appraisal 
be made upon the whole parcel of land as one tract for 
sale on the open market; and, second, as a corollary to 
the first question, does the respondent here meet the 
definition of a willing seller when it insists that the 
value must be based upon the individual building lot 
for sale to the ultimate consumer, the home owner. 
It should be here pointed out that upon the first trial 
of this case, the entire property of the respondent was 
divided into only two parcels. Parcel 1 consisted of 
approximately the same property as Parcel 1 in this 
case; and Parcel 2 in the first trial comprised the re-
mainder of the entire tract (Exhibit 1). The Deere 
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Estate, appellant in the first appeal, argued the pro-
priety of this division, and this Court, in the case of 
State v. Peek, supra, said, at page 638 of the Pacific 
Eeporter : 
" T h e court did not err in dividing this property 
into only two parcels instead of six requested by 
appellants. Parcel I as the property was divided 
by the court was the same as appellants' requested 
Parcel I, and the court divided the rest of appel-
lant 's lands which were taken into Parcel I I . Ap-
pellants argue that where land is platted into 
residential lots each lot constitutes as a matter of 
law a separate parcel, but they are not in a posi-
tion to urge this here because they have requested 
no such division. Parcel I, which is the same as 
their proposed Parcel I, contains all of the platted 
residential lots. All of those lots were platted 
and were being used as a unit in a project to 
divide and sell such lots as residential property 
and the court wTas therefore justified in making 
the division as it d id ." 
The pretrial order in the present case, among other 
things, made the following statement: 
" . . . 4. The primary question for determination 
i s : What was the fair market value on the 12th 
day of July, 1951, of the tract of land belonging 
to the Deere Estate and taken by the State of 
Utah in this proceeding. 
" 5 . Incident thereto, for the purposes of trial, 
and orderly and systematic procedure, in pre-
senting evidence of value and avoiding confusion 
in the considerations and deliberation of the jury, 
is the question of classifying or dividing the lands 
in sections or parcels similar in conditions, pos-
14 
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sible uses, value standards, etc., at the time of the 
taking, to-wit: July 12, 1951." 
The order then describes 8 parcels and makes reference 
to Exhibit 25 of the previous trial. Exhibit 1 of the 
present trial was agreed to by the parties and each of 
the 8 tracts described in this pretrial order was given 
a special coloring on Exhibit 1. 
We did not take issue with this pretrial order as the 
division into 8 parcels for the purpose of presenting 
the evidence seemed proper and within the trial court's 
discretion; but we urge upon this Court that the dividing 
of Parcel 1 into sixty-two separate building lots for 
purpose of valuation and instructing the jury that they 
should so consider them, was a direct contradiction of 
the pretrial order and is contrary to the law applicable 
to condemnation cases. At all phases of this proceeding, 
counsel for the State strenuously objected to this method 
of valuation. 
Appellant objected to the giving of Instruction No. 
9 (E. 517). By that instruction the trial Court told the 
jury that they should disregard all of the evidence 
prof erred by the State's appraisers and that they should 
consider each of the sixty-two lots as a single parcel (R. 
79). Appellant objected to the giving of Instructions 
Nos. 12 and 13 (R. 517). Again, those instructions in 
effect informed the jury that they could and should value 
each lot in Parcel 1 individually based upon the testi-
mony of the appraisers for respondents and that their 
verdict should be a mathematical total of all of the sixty-
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two lots in Parcel 1. We objected to the giving of In-
struction No. 17 (E. 517), and again by this instruction 
the Court informed the jury that "you are not to take 
into consideration any speculative increase or decrease 
in values that may occur or have occurred in the future; 
nor any consideration of future tax or sale commission 
that might be paid for future sales, . . . nor possible 
future expenses that defendants be saved by selling now ; 
nor any interest the defendants might be saved or be 
entitled to receive . . . " (E. 88). 
The appellant requested certain instructions and 
those particularly pertinent here are those designated 
ajs Plaintiff's Eequested Instructions Nos. 10, 11, and 
12. (E. 65, 66 and 67). The trial court has noted on each 
of these instructions that they were given in substance 
or were covered in other instructions. We most strenu-
ously urge that they were not so covered, but on the 
contrary the language of the instructions given and re-
ferred to above were directly opposed to those instruc-
tions requested; and we objected to the court's refusal 
to give these requested instructions (E. 518). 
Specifically, in our Eequested Instruction No. 10 the 
value of each of the Parcels involved was "to be meas-
ured by the fair market value of such parcel as an entirety 
as of July 12, 1951 . . . " Our Eequested Instruction No. 
11 reads as follows: 
"You are not to consider what the land was worth 
to the defendants for speculation, or for merely 
possible uses, nor what they claim it was worth 
16 
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to them, nor what it would sell for under special 
or extraordinary circumstances, but you are to 
find the fair market value of each of the Parcels 
1 to 8 as of July 12, 1951, if offered in the market 
under ordinary circumstances; that is to say, the 
price at which an owner of each of said parcels, 
under no compulsion, would have been willing to 
take for it on July 12, 1951, if he desired to sell, 
and which a buyer, under no compulsion, who 
desired and was able to buy, would have been 
willing to pay." 
And in our Eequested Instruction No. 12 we most defi-
nitely asked that the jury be told that they could not 
separately assess each lot, in the following words: 
" In assessing the value of any of the parcels you 
are not to value separately any platted lot or lots 
therein. You may take into consideration that on 
July 12, 1951, a plat of a portion of Parcel 1 had 
been filed with the county and the purposes for 
which said platted portion and all other portions 
of Parcel 1 were most suitable, but your value 
must be the value of the whole of Parcel 1, the 
platted and unplatted portions taken together as 
one unit. And you are further instructed that you 
may not arrive at your verdict by an addition of 
all of the contemplated lots in said tract or tracts, 
but you are confined to an evaluation of the whole 
of each parcel of land as a unit for the highest 
and best purpose to which it was adaptable by 
these defendants on the date in question.'" (Italics 
ours) 
The italicized part of the foregoing instruction is directly 
contrary to the instructions as given and particularly as 
to Instructions Nos. 9, 12, 13, and 17 as given. We will 
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hereinafter demonstrate that the requested instructions 
are the proper ones in condemnation proceedings. 
Also, at the conclusion of the respondent's case, tlite 
State of Utah moved to strike from the record all the] > 
evidence of values submitted by the witnesses for the) ^ 
respondent as to Parcel 1 for the reason that such evi-f 
dence was in violation of the pretrial order and wa$ 
contrary to the law as it relates to evidence in condem-
nation cases (R. 316). 
And finally it is our contention that the giving of \ 
Instruction No. 10 (R. 80) and the failure to give our \ 
Requested Instruction No. 5 (R. 60) constitutes preju- j 
dicial error. Proper objections were made (R. 517 and \ 
518), and we contend that the instruction given does not j 
properly define a willing seller and a willing buyer and 
that the instruction not given does constitute the proper 
definition. 
We respectfully urge upon this Court that the theory 
of the respondents, which was adopted by the trial court 
and contained in his charge to the jury, did not provide 
for just compensation for the taking of the property 
involved; but this theory permitted recovery by the 
respondents of future speculative profits without any 
regard for any items of cost in connection therewith. It 
was conceded that the subdivision business is one of risk 
and there was no evidence offered that in any way contra-
dicted the statement made by the witness, Ashton, to 
the effect that it was the sale of the last twenty-five per-
18 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
:./4^u^w - - £ &^J *y^tv.1#,^.,, ~-*~ **" *" ' y 
cen of a subdivision that constituted the profit of the 
promoter. 
Yet, in this present case, not only did the respondents 
recover for that last twenty-five percent in full but with-
. out any risk and without the necessity of spending one 
penny in costs, which admittedly they would have in-
curred if they had been permitted to proceed with the 
sales of the lots in the subdivision. The record reveals 
that Mr. Dean Brayton and Mr. A. B. Paulsen were 
acting for the respondents, the one as it managing agent 
and the other as its architect and planner; their services 
were continuous and certainly not free. In addition there 
were other employees needed from time to time. At the 
time a lot within the subdivision was sold, the respondents 
would be required to furnish abstracts of title, to place 
revenue stamps on the deed of conveyance, and to pay a 
sales commission to the realtor securing the buyer. If 
the selling of the subdivision extended over any period 
of time, there would be additional taxes; and in a trans-
action of this kind, interest on the investment and a profit 
to the promoter for his risk, for his know-how and for 
his time are involved. None of these items were con-
sidered by the appraisers for the Deere Estate who came 
up with a figure which represented a mathematical total 
of the retail value that they placed on each individual 
lot within Parcel 1. The State appraisers considered all 
of these items in arriving at their result, but the trial 
court did not even permit the jury to consider this ap-
proach and directed that they could not consider these 
items by Instructions No. 9 and 17. 
19 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 Nichols on Eminent Domain, Section 12.2(1) at 
page 32, defines market value, as follows: 
" B y fair market value is meant the amount of , v^ 
money which a purchaser willing but not obliged 19 
to buy the property would pay to an owner 
willing but not obliged to sell it, taking into con-
sideration all uses to which the land was adapted 
and might in reason be applied." 
29 C.J.S. on Eminent Domain, Section 137 at page 
974, gives this definition of market value: 
" T h e market value of property injured or taken 
for public use is commonly defined as the price \ / 
it will bring when offered for sale by one wTho 0 * 
desires, but is not required, to sell, and is sought 
by one who desires, but is not required to buy, 
after due consideration of all the elements reason-
ably affecting value." 
And in 18 Am. Jur . on Eminent Domain, Section 242 
at page 875, this definition of market value is given : 
"When a parcel of land is taken by eminent do-
main, the measure of compensation to be awarded ^ \J 
the owner is the price which would be agreed upon ™ * 
at a voluntary sale between an owner willing to 
sell and a purchaser willing to buy; in other words 
the test is the fair market value of the land." 
Ealph Wright, testifying as an expert appraiser for 
the respondents, at page 160 of the record, gave his defi-
nition as follows: 
" F a i r market value is the highest price, expressed 
in terms of money, which a property will bring if 
exposed for sale in the open market, allowing a 
reasonable time to find a purchaser who buys with 
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full knowledge of all the uses to which it is 
adapted and capable of being used, both buyer /t± / \ 
and seller acting intelligently and willingly with-
out compulsion." 
Mr. Wallace in his evidence for the respondents used 
a very similar definition (R. 234). And Mr. Benedict 
stated that he used the same definition as the one that 
Mr. Wright did. The appraisers for the State used 
similar definitions, that given by Mr. Werner Kiepe (R. 
339) and that used by Mr. C. Francis Solomon (R. 468-9) 
being almost identical with that given by Mr. Wright. 
Mr. Edward M. Ashton gave two definitions of market 
value both of which are similar in form and substance 
to the definitions heretofore quoted. The problem is n o t \ 
therefore, to define market value as all of the appraisers | 
used the same or similar definitions, but to apply this ^ 
definition to the case at hand; and we respectfully urge / ; 
upon this Court that the application by the respondents' I 
appraisers is not correct and does violence to the defi- \ 
nition and that the evidence in this record consistent 
with that definition is that given by the appraisers who J. 
testified on behalf of the State of Utah. 
To demonstrate the fundamental error in the re-
spondents' theory, may we first call attention to the ever 
present use of the term "willing seller" or its equivalent. 
I t is our contention that the evidence offered on behalf 
of the respondent shows beyond a shadow of a doubt 
that they were not a willing seller on the open market, 
but rather that they were willing to sell only upon con-
dition that they receive the retail value of each individual 
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lot and that they would refuse to sell to a willing pur-
chaser offering to buy the entire tract under the terms 
of the definitions above quoted. 
The question here involved as to whether it is proper 
to treat each building lot as a single parcel for purpose 
of valuation is inextricably bound up with the proper 
application of this definition of fair market value. The 
cases we have found and which are hereafter cited deal 
witlt analogous situation^ and we have found no case ^ 
jvhere the parcel of land is similar to the present fact, 
that is, one with a complete subdivision and a contem-
plated subdmsion within the same tract. However, this 
is said to be immaterial; and "while the mere filing of a 
subdivision map has been held not to establish the po-
tentiality of the property for building purposes, the 
failure to file such a map has been held not to exclude 
consideration of such possible use." 4 Nichols on Emi-
nent Domain, Section 12.3142(1) at page 109. 
This same section of 4 Nichols on Eminent Domain 
at page 107, contains this statement: 
"The most characteristic illustration of the rule j 
that market value is not limited to value for the 1 
existing use and the situation in which it is most j -
frequently invoked, and also most frequently I 
abused, is found in those cases where evidence is / 
offered of what the value of a tract of land that j 
is used for agricultural purposes or is vacant and I 
unused would be if cut up into house-lots. It is 
well settled that if land is so situated that it is 
actually available for building purposes, its value j 
for such purposes may be considered, even if it 1 
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is used as a farm or is covered with brush and 
boulders. The measure of compensation is not, 
however, the aggregate of the prices of the lots 
into which the tract could be best divided, since 
the expense of cleaning off and improving the 
land, laying out streets, dividing it into lots, ad-
vertising and selling the same, and holding it and 
paying taxes and interest until all the lots are 
disposed of cannot be ignored and is too uncertain 
and conjectural to be computed. The measure of 
compensation is the market value of the land as 
a whole, taking into consideration its value for 
building purposes if that is its most available use^ 
"The possibility for building purposes must not 
be entirely remote and speculative, thereby ren-
dering evidence of such use inadmissible; how-
ever, the mere fact that there are no buildings on 
the land at the time of the taking does not make 
such potential use speculative or remote as a 
matter of law. While the mere filing of a sub-
division map has been held not to establish the 
potentiality of the property for building purposes, 
the failure to file such a map has been held not to 
exclude consideration of such possible use. Nor 
may the potential use for sub-division purposes 
be excluded merely because the existing use is 
purely agricultural." 
<^7 
18 Am. Jur. on Eminent Domain, Section 244 at page 
881, states: 
"For example, when a tract taken by eminent 
domain is used as a farm, the owner is entitled 
to have its possible value for building purposes 
considered; but the jury or other tribunal is not 
to determine how it could best be divided into 
building lots, nor conjecture how fast they could 
be sold, nor at what price per lot." 
>#. 
? 
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/ 
t 
A statement to the same effect is found in 29 C.J.S. on 
Eminent Domain, Section 160 at page 1027. 
An early case, decided by the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania in 1909, contains a fact situation quite 
comparable to the present one. This case of Catlin v. 
Northern Coal & Iron Co., 74 Atl. 56, concerned the con-
demnation of right of way over a tract of 30 acres, 18 of 
which were situated on high ground available for build-
j ing lots. This 18 acre tract had been divided into such 
lots, and into streets and alleys, which were marked on 
the ground, and had offered the lots for sale. There had 
been no sales primarily because the asking price was 
somewhat greater than the best offer. The main issue 
in the case was in connection with admission of evidence 
and in the fact that the witnesses were permitted to con-} ylAJu> 
sider that the land had been divided into lots and the I 
specific question involved, in. the case at bar waft noj 
d|scuss„ed. However, at page 57 of the Atlantic Eeporter, 
the Court said : 
" T h e test in every such case is, What was the 
market value of the land, at the time of the ap-
propriation, for any available purpose? If it was 
then available for sale as building lots, and had 
a market value for such purpose at the time of 
the entry, it is proper to consider this element 
of value in determining what the property was 
then worth. All of our cases recognize that the 
use to which the land is best adapted may always 
be considered in estimating market value. If it 
has immediate value for sale as building lots, it 
would be a very harsh rule which would deny the 
owner the benefit accruing to him by reason of 
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having his property so favorably located. As we 
viewT the case at bar, there is no doubt that a 
considerable portion of the land of appellee was 
available for sale as building lots, and that it had 
a market value as such at the time of the entry. 
Under these circumstances it was proper to con-
sider the present value of the land for this use\ 
at the time of the appropriation. Of course future j 
and speculative value as a lot proposition could/ 
not be considered, and, as we read the testimony/ 
this rule was not violated." 
An earlier Pennsylvania case, Pennsylvania S.V.R. 
Co. v. Cleary, 125 Pa. 442, 17 A. 468, was quoted with 
approval in the case of United States v. 8,544 Acres of 
Land, 147 F . 2d 596, as follows: 
" W e do not agree with the learned judge that 
there was any such question for the jury in this 
case. The jury are to value the tract of land and 
that only. They are not to determine how it could 
best be divided into building lots, nor conjecture 
how fast they could be sold, nor at what price per 
lot. A speculator or investor, in deciding what 
price he could afford to pay, would consider the 
chances and probabilities of the situation as then ^ 
actually existing. A jury should do the same : 
thing. They are not to inquire what a speculator 
might be able to realize out of a resale in the 
future, but what a present purchaser would be % 
willing to pay for it in the condition it is now in. 
This is a rule that is well settled, and the court 
should have drawn the attention of the jury to it, 
so as to have left no room for uncertainty on their 
part. They should have been told that they hacff 
nothing to do with the subdivision of this tract, 
the price of the lots, or the probability of their 
sale; but that they were to ascertain the fair sell-
&& 
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mg value of the land before and after the entry 
by the railroad company, in order to determine 
the actual damage done to its owner." 
And in this same federal case, the following charge to 
the jury was held proper, at page 598 of the Federal 
Reporter: 
"On cross examination witnesses on both sides 
were permitted by the Court to be examined con-
cerning the development for which the property 
is adapted. This, of course, was to bring out the 
testimony as to what this land is best adapted for, 
but it was also permitted to see if any witness 
based his estimate on the entire tract exclusively 
on a basis of individual lots or houses, and if so, 
his estimate would have to be excluded from the 
ju ry ; but all the witnesses on both sides testified 
that their estimates were based on other proper 
factors, and for that reason the estimates of the 
four witnesses will all be submitted for your con-
sideration, but let me again caution you that you 
are to value the tract of l a n d ^ s ^ f j i p r i l 21, 1941, 
and that oiily. You are not to determine how it! 
could best be divided into building lots, nor con-I 
jecture how fast they could be sold, nor at what! 
price per lot. You should not inquire what aj 
speculator might be able to realize out of a resale! 
in the future, but you should consider what a! 
purchaser would have been willing to pay for it 
on April 21,1941, in the condition it was then i n . " | 
The actual fact situation in the foregoing federal 
case is not discussed except as it appears from the testi-
mony quoted which indicates that the property involved 
was in the City of Philadelphia and that a subdivision 
within the city was in some state of development. How-
26 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ever, in the Virginia case of Appalachian Electric Power 
Co. v. Gorman, 61 S.E. 2d 33, at page 36, the Court de-
scribes the land involved as follows: 
"The land over which the easement is taken is 
an irregularly shaped tract of 43x/2 acres on the 
west side of the Trents Ferry Eoad about % of a 
mile from the city of Lynchburg, Virginia. I t is 
described as the finest piece of property close to 
Lynchburg for a high-class subdivision for per-
sons desiring to build expensive residences. I t is 
located on hilly terrain and readily adapted to 
the highest type of subdivision for homes and 
residences. Immediately adjacent to it are a num-
ber of homes and estates, valued at $25,000 to 
$100,000 each. I t is pictured as a natural con-
tinuation of one of the finest residential sections 
close to Lynchburg, suitable for a high-class sub-
division for persons desiring to build expensive 
residences. One of the witnesses said it is 'as fine 
a piece of property for subdivision as I have seen 
anywhere in the United States; and I have sub-
divided from north and south, east and west.' I t 
is bounded by beautiful estates to the east, and a 
high-class subdivision borders it on the south, 
with many expensive homes. I t is in demand for 
residential subdivision and purchasers have al-
ready offered to purchase portions of it. 
"The entire 43% acres have been held intact 
without buildings. In 1940 the owners employed 
Charles F . Gillette, an experienced landscape 
a rcjjjtect1 to plat th&Jtia.ct into one hundred lots / ' 
and streets, having the streets follow the natural 
contours of the property without following the 
usual gridiron type, in order to avoid cuts and
 N 
fills. Trees were. pifmtQd affording to the plan, J 
and water and sewer lines were mapped, bids / 
being obtained therefor; but these plans were 
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halted with the beginning of World War II. City 
water is available within 200 feet. Natural gas 
lines run along the edge of the property. The land 
has been cleared so that prospective purchasers 
can obtain a good view of the entire subdivision. 
It has a right of way to United States Route 501, 
and residents can reach the business center of 
Lynchburg within fifteen minutes. It has the ad-
vantage of county taxes. A city bus service runs 
within 200 yards of the property, and there is a 
business center a short distance therefrom. The 
property is rural, though suburban to the city of 
Lynchburg, with a perfect mountain view and is 
free from the usual lights, noise, and dirt of a 
busy city. It is undisputed that it has more ad-
vantages than are common to the usual sub-
division. 
"The present market value of the property, as a 
whole, for subdivision purposes was valued from 
$55,000 to $65,250, or at $1,250 to $1,500 per acre. 
The easement sought to be taken cuts diagonally 
across the northernmost tip or corner of the 
property, runs over five lots and embraces one 
and three-quarters acres. The power line and 
tower proposed to be built stand 23 or 24 feet 
above the highest point on the entire tract. The 
construction will interfere with a direct view of 
the mountains from some portions of the property, 
and will add some hazards to the land." 
The testimony of the various appraisers in this case 
commenced at $2500.00 and ran as high as $32,200.00. The 
award made by the Commissioners was $1500.00 for the 
property taken and $8500.00 for severance damage, and 
this award was affirmed. At page 39 of the Reporter, 
the following statement of the Court is adaptable to the 
present case: 
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*'The easement affected the size and shape of the ^7 
tract for development. It rendered one and three $**-& ^ 
q^rlgx&~-a£x&s^^ for use by the land-
owners. It necessitated a change in the location 
oTTKe streets, the shape and location of the lots 
different from that originally planned, and less-
ened the value of the component parts of the tract, 
thereby reducing the value of the property as a 
whole. It is true that the damages should not be 
added up lot by lot; for instance, by awarding so 
much for this one and so much for that. Thehx 
damage should be considered from the standpoint / _ /,, 
°^ injury to the v^1nft..nf tlm prnpprty as q, ^ |)o1eT f ^ \J 
takingjinto consideration the elements affecting 1 
i ts Adap tab i l i t y f o r fWplnpTYiPnf flfl ft piifrfljyiflimi >' / 
An early Kansas case, Kansas City & Topeka Ry. 
Co. v. Splitlog, decided in 1890, and reported at 25 Pac. 
202, contains the following statement by the Court: 
" In cases like this, where the damages are limited 
to the value of the land appropriated, the proper 
inquiry is what was the market value of such land, 
for any present use, in the condition in which it 
was immediately prior to its condemnation by the 
company. Witnesses testifying as to the value of 
such land may consider any use to which the 
ground may be presently put in forming their 
opinions as to its value, and its surroundings 
may be shown to the jury, its nearness to or dis-
tance from a town, village, or city, or other im-
provements that tend to affect its value; but the 
jury are to value the land as a whole in the con-
dition in which it was when taken. They have 
nothing to do with its subdivision into lots or 
blocks. They may consider its location, and the 
effect its location has upon its value as a whole; 
but the evidence as tlLhow many lots,jj^mmld 
make, and what I h ^ y y ^ 
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division, is wholly improper. If an illustration 
was wanted to show the impropriety of such evi-
dence, we do not know where we could find a 
stronger or more apt one than the evidence this 
witness furnishes. The witness is asked the size 
of lots on Kansas avenue, the value of such lots, I 
and how many such lots an acre^wouldmale, and/ 
then it drops out that an acre of such lots are 
worth $55,000, without improvements; that the 
witness paid at that rate per acre. Snch^evidence 
is certainly hjgMy_jjnpxaper. It furnishes no 
proper measure of value, so far as the land ap-
propriated is concerned, with which alone the jury 
has to do, and is well calculated to mislead the 
jury by furnishing a false and fanciful measure 
of damages. Without going further into this 
record, for the reasons given in connection with 
these, the first and third assignments, it is recom-
mended that the judgment of the district court 
be reversed, and the case remanded for new trial." 
A most excellent statement of the law applicable to 
these cases is contained in the Colorado case of Was-
senich v. City and County of Denver, 186 Pac. 533. On 
page 537, the Court states: 
"Complaint is made because the court instructed 
the jury that it is the present market value at the 
time of the trial that is to be determined and 
allowed. The statute provides for a special ver-
dict which shall contain the fair, actual cash 
market value of the land taken, and the direct, 
fair, and actual damages caused by the improve-
ment to the remainder of the property not taken. 
Defendant contends he was entitled to the highest \ 
value that he might be able to obtain in the future; fQJ 
by waiting for a better market caused by a demand 
for such property, or tvaiting for a customer why 
6 
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would pay on the basis of the most advantageous / 
use to which it could be put, reasonably. This isj 
not the law. The jury are to determine and allow 
the present fair, cash market value at the time of 
the trial, and are not to allow for any speculative 
or prospective values. In determining the present 
cash value the most advantageous use to which 
the property may reasonably be applied may be 
considered. Any reasonable future use to which 
the land may be adapted or applied by men of\ 
ordinary prudence and judgment may be consid-S 
ered in so far only as it may assist the jury inr 
arriving at the present market value. The owner 
is entitled to have considered the most advan4 
tageous use in the future to which the land may^ 
be reasonably applied, not with the view of allow-
ing him for speculative or prospective damages 
or values, but only as such evidence may bear 
upon or affect or assist in arriving at the present 
market value. It is the duty of the jury to find 
and allow no more than the present market value, 
no matter what the future prospects may be, and 
this character of evidence may be considered only 
for the purpose of ascertaining the market value 
at the time of the trial. After considering any 
and all reasonable uses to which the property may 
be put in the future, the question is, taking all 
things into consideration, whaLas.^,tke present 
market value, not what will or mayJ^4i&*^alue 
later on account of some use to whL<^ii-«fifta^be 
put in the future. Market value ordinarily means 
what price property would bring if sold in the 
open market under ordinary and usual circum-
stances, for cash, assuming that the owner is will-
ing to sell and the purchaser willing to buy, but 
neither under any obligation to do so. Sojthe 
question for the jury to angrwetf^^ 
its reasonable availability^ 
or t h e ^ ^ how much would 
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the property bring in cash if offered now for sale s\ f£/ 
hyjme whoL^j^r^jL^?! w a s n ° t obliged, to sell, ^ A w - -
and was bought by one who was willing, but not 
obliged, to buy. As to the residue, the question 
was, how much is the present fair cash market 
value of the remainder of the land, not taken, 
decreased or diminished in value by reason of 
the improvement. The court fully instructed upon 
these matters, and we find no errors in this par-
ticular. " 
We have underlined a portion of the foregoing quo-
tation by way of emphasizing its applicability to the 
theory here advanced by the respondents and also be-
cause this language is characteristic of the claims of 
respondents. They do not want to sell upon an open 
market but rather they desire to wait until a sale can 
be made by them on their own terms. 
A series of California cases have uniformly applied 
the rule for which we contend to the effect that the jury 
may consider all uses to which the property is reasonably 
adaptable, but the final result must be the present market 
value of the entire parcel and not what each lot within a 
subdivision may sell for at some future time. The first . * J-* 
of these cases is City of Los Angeles v. Hughes, 262 Pac. ^  ' 
737, which was decided by the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia, and in it the Court said : 
" I f the argument of counsel for these appellants 
is intended to go one step further, and it is sought 
to establish that the value of the land must be 
estimated, not only on a basis of a subdivision 
possibility, but also on the basis of what the 
owners would be able to obtain for the lots after 
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I W f c , r?$ <L*Jl 7 / ^ J* f, 27uy 3*~<£# r%s 
subdivision had actually taken place (and the ^ 
argument is open to that interpretation), we are IJOJ^^J^OA 
unable to agree, nor do the cases relied upon by %A ^  $U* 
these appellants support this contention." d*Ak < 
In the case of East Bay Municipal Utility Dist. v. 
Kieffer, (Calif.) 278 Pac. 476, at page 480, the court said: 
"Speculative and conjectural calculations of 
prospective receipts and expenditures and conse-
quent profits to be derived from a prospective 
enterprise not only throw no light on the issue 
of the market value of the land to be used in the 
enterprise, but operate to confuse and mislead the 
minds of the ju ro r s . " 
And in the case of People v. LaMacchia, 264 P. 2d 
15, decided by the Supreme Court of California in an 
action to condemn property for a freeway, the following 
instruction was fully upheld: 
Y 
" I n this connection, the jury was instructed: 
'Whatever purpose the Defendants had in con-
nection with the future use of the property, can 
add nothing to its market value. The fact that 
this purpose is defeated by condemnation, how-
ever much a disappointment, is not a matter of 
compensation. A use existing or contemplated on 
property is distinct from the market value of the 
property itself and is not the conclusive basis for 
fixing such market value, and is not to be con-
sidered as determining the value of the land. 
Value in use is not to be considered by you as 
determining the market value of the property. A 
plan which Defendants may or may not have had 
for the improvement of the property adds nothing 
to the market value. The fact that a plan for the 
improvement, if any, was affected by condemna-
33 
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tion, however much a disappointment, is not a 
matter of compensation.' It must be assumed that 
the jury understood such clear and unambiguous 
language and correctly applied the instructions to 
the evidence.'' Nunneley v. Edgar Hotel, 36 Cal. 
2d 493, 500, 225 P. 2d 497; Henderson v. Los 
Angeles Traction Co., 150 Cal. 689, 697, 89 P. 976. 
We have examined many other cases that have held 
that a proposed subdivision must be valued as a single 
parcel and among these cases are Nantakala Power S\ 
Light Company v. Moss (No. Car.) 17 S.E. 2d 10; Union]
 / 
Exploration Co. v. Moffat Tunnel Imp. Dist. (Colo.) 89 \ l^^^ 
P. 2d 257; CityTof Napa v. Navoni (Calif.) 132 P. 2d 566; } IMf " 
City & County of Denver v. Tondall (Colo.) 282 Pac. 191; 
and TJwrnton v. Birmingham, 250 Ala. 651, 35 So. 2d 545, 
7 A.L.R. 2d 773. 
Also of interest and indicative of the holdings of the 
courts of the various states are two cases from Oregon 
although it is only proper to note that in this jurisdiction 
separate estates in a tract of land sought to be condemned 
are not separately assessed but the award is made for 
the land and then apportioned among the respective 
owners as their interests may appear. This is, of course, 
a most literal interpretation of the common law rule 
followed in all the states that a proceeding in eminent 
domain is a taking of the land and that it is not a taking 
of the rights of the owners involved. This rule is relaxed 
by the Utah statutes and under the interpretation given 
our statutes in the case of Totvn of Perry v. Thomas, 82 
Utah 159, 22 P. 2d 343, separate owners in a tract of 
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land sought to be condemned are entitled to have their 
respective interests separately assessed. 
The first case from Oregon is State v. Cerruti, 214 P. 
2d 346, where the land to be condemned was used as a 
celery farm and the owner sought to show anticipated-
jjrofits. The court held that it was error to mstrucflhe 
jury that in determining market value they might "con-
sider the profits which a person in the defendants' 
position could normally anticipate from the best possible 
use of the land." 
And in State v. Beat, an Oregon case, 233 P. 2d 242, 
the state highway condemned certain property, which had 
been prepared for a subdivision and a plat actually sub-
mitted for recording although rejected by the county 
officials. In that case the following instruction wTas re-
quested by the State: 
" I instruct you that in determining the fair cash 
market value of the real property described in 
the complaint as Parcel No. 1, should you find 
from the evidence that the highest and best use 
of Parcel No. 1 is for subdivision purposes then 
Parcel No. 1 may be valued according to its use 
for subdivision purposes, but, in no event, irt> 
determining the fair cash market value of Parcel 
No.l shall you consider the number of lots that\ 
Parcel No. 1 might be divided into or the value 
of such lots as separate parcels." 
The portion of the foregoing instruction that we 
- have underlined was refused by the trial court and this 
V \ ' w a s held to be reversible error. Our Eequested Instrue-
* V N 35 
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tion No. 12 in the present case is similar in form and 
substance and we most strenuously contend that it was 
a proper statement of the law and that failure to give 
that instruction was highly prejudicial to the State of 
Utah. 
At this juncture, it is necessary to emphasize the 
theory adopted by the State appraisers and is referred 
to in the record in some instances and specifically by Mr. 
Kiepe as the income approach (R. 343). And, in answer 
to the question as to what is the income approach, Mr. 
Kiepe responded: 
'' The income approach is an analysis of the value 
of the property based upon what it can produce 
in dollars. The income approach sometimes in-
volves the property which has a continuing income 
such as an apartment house. An apartment house 
would have a constant income. In case of a sub-
division of sand and gravel deposit, we have an 
income approach, but we have a gradually dimin-
ishing or liquid asset, but it is still the income 
approach. The income approach is used in all 
properties where the ownership is expressly for 
profit. It is the prime and elementary and the 
final important approach where the purpose of 
the ownership of that property is to obtain a 
profit. That is true of a duplex. It is true of a 
store property. It is true of an office building. 
It is true of a sand and gravel deposit. It is true 
of a subdivision." (R. 344-345). 
And in the application of this income approach to 
the properties here involved, Mr. Kiepe commenced with 
a figure that in his opinion represented the final gross 
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selling price of the lots within a particular area; and, 
by way of a paranthetical remark, this is the place where 
the appraisers for the Deere Estate stopped. From this 
gross sales price, Mr. Kiepe subtracted the necessary 
selling costs stated as advertising, abstracts, revenue 
stamps, sales commissions, taxes and general overhead 
based on the length of time required to dispose of the 
property; and also from this gross sales price and, in 
each instance depending upon the risk and time involved, 
a deduction was made for the risk profit that an owner 
would be entitled to which represented interest on the 
money invested and a return for the management of the 
property and for the services that he necessarily would 
render. The final figure arrived at was the fair market 
value and it is crystal clear that a buyer of this property 
will pay no more than this figure. The evidence of Mr. 
Kiepe that has been summarized in this respect is con-
tained on pages 362 to 366 of the record. 
We contend that the evidence of Mr. Kiepe and that 
of Mr. Ashton and Mr. Solomon, the two other state 
appraisers, was the only competent evidence of value 
introduced in this trial as to Parcel 1. However, thtT\ 
trial court not only failed to grant our motion to strike / ' ) 
the evidence of value as to this parcel presented by re-( Q 
spondents, but directed the jury to ignore and give no^ j 
consideration to the evidence above summarized (R. 79 
and 88). We again urge upon this Court that we at least \ ) 
had the right to have the jury consider our evidence or J ) 
an equal basis with that of the respondents. 
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C£C£J**< ]^^x^^^^\ioxnm case of Redwood City Ele-
mentary School District v. Gregoire, 276 P. 2d 78, the 
School District sought to condemn a parcel of land used 
as a summer home and for the sale and shipment of cut 
flowers. However, the expert appraisers all agreed that 
the highest and best use was for subdivision purposes 
and that the land could be divided into approximately 
sixty lots. The two appraisers for the school district 
gave figures of $78,750.00 and $78,400.00, while the two 
appraisers for the owner gave $153,000.00 and $146,-
750.00; and this last figure was demonstrated &s a mgthe-
• jrjjsiM matical total qf_the value of each of thejjjixty lots. A 
*nt 
jury returned a verdict of $83,500.00 and the owner ap-
pealed. The appellate court affirmed hold that it^was 
fc proper to submit both sets o£ values to the jurj^and that 
the following instruction was a correct statement of the 
applicable law: 
"You are instructed that you are to determine 
the market value of the 12.23 acre parcel of land 
as a whole as of November 14th, 1952, and not 
as if it had been divided into small parcels. 
"Evidence, if any, of what an owner might plan 
to do with the property is not to be considered 
by you as enhancing its market value." 
Eeferring again to page 18 of this brief, we feel that 
we have conclusively demonstrated that Instruction No. 
10, as given, and particularly the last sentence thereof, 
cannot be upheld. This last sentence says: 
"Also as a willing seller, he has the right and it\ 
must be assumed that he may exercise that right, j 
to dispose of the property in such manner a s / 
38 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
would result in obtaining its fair market value| 
for the highest and best use to which the property 
or any of its parts can be adapted." 
We submit that this is improper, that there is no time 
limitation placed upon it, that the condemnee under the 
law has no such right, and that it does violence to the 
definition of a willing seller upon an open market to a 
willing buyer; and we also submit that failure to give 
our Requested Instruction No. 5, under the circumstances 
of this case, was error and prejudicial to the State of 
Utah. 
POINT II. 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY PER-
MITTED THE JURY TO CONSIDER AND TO 
ASSESS DAMAGES TO THE WATER DISTRIBU-
TION SYSTEM IN THE FOLLOWING PARTICU-
LARS: 
(A) THE COURT IMPROPERLY PERMITTED1 
THE WITNESS, ULLRICH, TO TESTIFY AS 
TO VALUES OF THE WATER DISTRIBUTION 
AND TRANSMISSION SYSTEM. 
(B) THE COURT IMPROPERLY RECEIVED*" 
EXHIBIT 39D PERTAINING TO VALUES OF 
THE WATER DISTRIBUTION AND TRANS-
MISSION SYSTEM. 
(C) THAT THE COURT IMPROPERLY DE-V 
NIED THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE 
THE EVIDENCE OF THE WITNESSES, BRAY-
TON AN£> ULLRICH AS TO VALUES OF THE ? 
WATER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM AND 
TRANSMISSION SYSTEM. 
duAW 
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(D) THAT THE COUBT IMPEOPEELY EE-
FUSED TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S EEQUESTED 
INSTEUCTION NO. 19. 
(E) THAT THE TEIAL COUET IMPEOPEELY 
PERMITTED THE WITNESS BEAYTON TO 
TESTIFY AS TO VALUES AS HE WAS 
NEITHEE AN EXPEET NOE AN OWNEE. 
In the decision of this Court in the former appeal 
of this case, State v. Peek, supra, the question of the 
water system was raised and discussed on page 638 of 
the Pacific Eeporter; and it was held that it was error 
for the trial court to exclude the evidence offered as to 
this water system and as to its value because this evi-
dence would have aided the jury "in arriving at their 
overall value of the property." But we do not believe 
that this Court intended that this water system was to 
be valued separately from the property condemned and, 
under the facts as presented, we contend that it was 
absolutely impossible to give it a separate valuation and 
that it was error to submit that question to the jury. 
At this juncture, we are required to call the Court's 
attention to the fact that Plaintiff's Eequested Instruc-
tion No. 19 does not appear in the record; this instruc-
tion reads as follows: 
"You are further instructed that the only evi-
dence of value as it pertains to the water works 
and water rights of the defendant is that value 
of the water rights given by the witness, Ullrich, 
and reduced by the witness, Brayton, to the sum 
of $11,290.00; and that all other evidence of value 
produced by the defendant is incompetent and 
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may not be considered by you in arriving at your 
verdict." 
We excepted to the Court's refusal to give this instruc-
tion (E. 518). 
The trial court did give an Instruction No. 19 (R. 
90), which was satisfactory as far as it went; but we 
earnestly urge that the remainder of the requested in-
struction should also have been given. 
Appellant's main contention concerning this ques-
tion of water distribution and transmission is that the 
evidence clearly shows that its value is included within 
the values placed by the appraisers upon the land itself 
and that to permit the jury to place a separate value 
upon it requires the State of Utah to pay for it twice. 
In our statement of facts on page 7 of this brief, we 
referred briefly to this statement of values made by the 
appraisers. Because of its importance in connection with 
the present phase of our argument, we feel compelled to 
quote the cross-examination of respondents' witness, 
Ralph Wright, commencing at the top of page 231 of the 
record in this case: 
"Q. In connection with the water lines that were 
within the Deere Estate property, and, particu-
larly I believe within Parcel 1, you knew, of 
course, that that belonged to the Deere Estate, 
did you not ? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. And did the cost— and did the actual fact 
that they were there reflect in your figures for 
those lots? 
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A. Yes, their presence there did. 
Q. And if they had not— 
A. (Continued) Was reflected in the values. 
Q. And if they had not been there, your figures 
would have been lower! 
A. That's correct/' 
The other two expert appraisers for the respondents 
made similar statements (R. 261 and R. 296). And in 
order to emphasize this picture, we again repeat the 
statement of respondents' witness, Ullrich, when he 
stated that at the time of the condemnation this water 
collection distribution system had no utility except to 
serve the property and lands subject to the condemnation 
suit. This witness did state that it could be adapted for 
other uses but the respondent offered no evidence as to 
what the cost of adaptation would be; and there was, 
therefore, no foundation upon which the questions of 
value could be propounded to either the witness, Ullrich, 
or the witness, Brayton. We objected to the questions 
asked Mr. Brayton (R. 317) and we objected to the 
introduction of Exhibit 39 (R. 321). And we moved to 
strike all of the evidence of values as to this water dis-
tribution system (R. 321). All of our objections and 
motions were overruled and denied. 
The cases we have cited under Point I of this brief 
are applicable here and in addition we desire to cite the 
case of Kinter v. United States, 156 F. 2d 5, 172 A.L.R. 
232, as peculiarly applicable to the problem presented 
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1 -v' ' ' 
here. In that case the court held that evidence of cost 
of(improvements was inadmissible and said: 
'
i
"As stated by Mr. Justice Reed in United States 
v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 90 L. Ed. 729, 
66 S. Ct. 596, 599, 'The Constitution and the 
statutes do not define the meaning of just compen-
sation. But it has come to be recognized that just 
compensation is the value of the interest taken. 
This is not the value to the owner for his par-
ticular purposes or to the condemnor for some 
special use but a so-called "market value." It 
is recognized that an owner often receives less 
than the value of the property to him but experi-
ence has shown that the rule is reasonably satis-
factory.' 
" I t has been said that isales at arm's length of 
similar property are the best evidence of market 
value.' Welch v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 6 
Cir. 1939,108 F. 2d 95,101, certiorari denied 1939, 
309 U.S. 688, 60 S. Ct. 889, 84 L. Ed. 1030. Even 
where there have been no sales of similar prop-
erty in the vicinity upon which a basis of valua-
tion might be predicated, the quest is still for 
'market value.' This may be more or less than 
the owner's investment in his property. The gov-
ernment may neither confiscate his bargain nor 
be required to assume his loss. But, it is the ' value 
of the interest' that is guaranteed; not the in-
vestment. 
"The owner may, because of his personal knowl-
edge of the property, the uses to which it may be 
put, the condition of the improvements erected 
thereon, testify as to its market value. May he 
also, in the first instance, state as a lump sum the 
total of all costs incurred by him over a period 
of years for repairs and improvements as bearing 
upon the question of fair market value? We think 
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not. Admittedly, cost is not synonymous with 
market value. A fortiori, cost of land and cost of 
improvements taken separately and added are not 
to be equalized with fair market value: cf. United 
States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 5 Cir, 1945,149 
F. 2d 81; McSorley v. Avalon Borough School 
District, 1927, 291 Pa. 252, 255, 139 A. 848." 
Also, the annotation in American Law Eeports fol-
lowing the above cited case discuss at some length the 
question of the competency of evidence of cost as evi-
dence of value in eminent domain proceedings, and fully 
support the position we have taken. And, in addition]] 
the case of Provo River Water Users Assoc, v. CarlowA 
103 Utah 93, 133 P. 2d 777, suggests that the evidence! 
offered by Mr. Brayton should have been received with; 
caution and the jury so instructed. 
In another case, A. D. Graham & Co. v. Pennsylvania 
Turnpike Comm. (Pa.) 33 A. 2d 22, the court held that 
evidence of value could not be sustained by showing cost 
when there was no evidence of any market for the prop-
erty for the purpose for which the cost was offered. The 
Court said: 
"For example, a certain kind of timber might be 
useful in the making of bows and arrows but if 
there was no market for those implements, the 
timber's value for such use could not be shown." 
It should be specifically stated that we do recognize 
the right of the respondents to recover for the value of 
their right to the use of the water from Wagner Spring 
and this does not appear to us to be open to question as 
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it has long been the law in this state that water and land ***** 
may be separated. But we strenuously contend that the ^ 
water transmission and distribution system, as far as 
this record is concerned, had no market value except with 
the property condemned and that its value is included 
within the values placed upon the land. 
POINT III. 
THAT THE COURT IMPROPERLY LIMITED THE 
PLAINTIFF AS TO THE EVIDENCE PROFFERED 
BY AND PROPOSED TO BE GIVEN BY THE WIT-
NESSES, SOLOMON AND ASHTON. 
Mr. Werner Kiepe, an expert appraiser testifying 
on behalf of appellant, gave a very thorough and com-
prehensive report as to his appraisal detailing the many 
steps he took and the many analysis he made in arriving 
at his opinion as to the fair market values of the property 
here involved. Appellant sought to elicit from Mr. Ed-
ward M. Ashton and from Mr. C. Francis Solomon their 
detailed analysis of how they arrived at fair market 
value and the steps they took, though similar in some 
respects, were also different in other respects from those 
taken by Mr. Kiepe. 
We were prevented from so doing by the objection 
of counsel for respondent and the ruling of the trial 
court. The colloquy between court and counsel, as shown 
commencing on page 430 of the record and c ontinuing 
through page 436, not only shows the ruling with respect 
to this point but clearly shows the difference in concept 
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and theory between the court and counsel for the re-
spondent on the one hand and counsel for the State of 
Utah on the other hand. 
During the former appeal of this case, State v. Peek, 
supra, the same counsel represented the Deere Estate 
and he strenuously contended before this Court that he 
had been severely limited in both his direct examination 
of his own witnesses and in his cross-examination of the 
other witnesses. This Court upheld that contention 
saying: 
" I t (the trial court) excluded on both direct and 
cross-examination evidence of the value of the 
various elements, items and parts of appellants' 
property being condemned in this action. . . . This 
was prejudicial error." 
We now make the same contention before this Court and 
submit that it was prejudicial error for the trial court 
to have so curtailed the presentation of the evidence of 
values on behalf of the State of Utah. 
POINT IV. 
THAT THE COURT IMPROPERLY GAVE IN-
STRUCTION NO. 15 AND PERMITTED THE JURY 
TO ASSESS AS VALUE THE STREETS WITHIN 
THE PROPERTY; THAT THE COURT IMPROP-
ERLY REFUSED TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S RE-
QUESTED INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 14 AND 15 AS TO 
OWNERSHIP OF PLATTED STREETS. 
The trial court gave Instruction No. 15 (R. 86) to 
which appellant duly excepted (R. 517). By this instruc-
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tion the jury was directed to value the interest of re-
spondents in Kennedy Drive. We contend that this was 
error first by reason of the fact that Kennedy Drive is 
not the subject of, nor included within, the property 
sought to be condemned. The 1953 Utah Legislature by 
Chapter 122 amended Section 63-11-10, Utah Code Anno-
tated 1953, and by that amendment removed Kennedy 
Drive from the property they had theretofore directed 
to be condemned. This action of the Legislature was 
upheld in the case of State v. Bird & Evans, Inc., 1 Utah 
2d 276, 265 P. 2d 639. 
Also, it is to be noted that the trial court gave no 
further instructions as to streets within the area and 
did not give Plaintiff's Requested Instructions Nos, 14 
and 15. There is a note attached to each instruction by 
the trial judge stating that each of these instructions 
were given in substance but we have carefully examined 
each of the instructions given and cannot agree with this 
notation; and, in addition, Instruction No. 15 as given 
is clearly in conflict with those requested. We duly ex-
cepted to the failure to give each of the requested in-
structions (R. 518). 
We respectfully submit that the instruction given 
was in error and that the instructions requested correctly 
state the law both because Kennedy Drive was not a part 
of this condemnation action and because the streets 
within the platted section of Parcel 1 belonged either to 
the city or the county. The two Utah cases of White v. 
Salt Lake City, 239 P. 2d 210, and Boskovich v. Midvale 
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City, 243 P . 2d 435, both uphold our contention that a 
platted street vests title thereto in either the city or the 
county and that the respondents had thereafter no 
further interest therein. 
POINT V. 
THAT T H E COURT GAVE NO INSTRUCTION AS 
TO BURDEN OF PROOF AND IMPROPERLY RE-
FUSED TO GIVE P L A I N T I F F ' S REQUESTED IN-
STRUCTION NO. 2 DEALING T H E R E W I T H . 
The appellants duly excepted to the trial court 's 
refusal to give Plaintiff's Requested Instruction No. 2 
(R. 517). That instruction reads as follows: 
'
i
 You are instructed that the burden of proving 
value, and the burden of proving damages, are 
burdens which the law puts upon the defendant, 
Deere Estate. These burdens of proof are success-
fully carried by defendant only if you find that 
it has established the truth of its contentions by 
a preponderance of the evidence. A i preponder-
ance of the evidence' is defined as that amount of 
evidence which is more convincing as to its truth, 
or which convinces the mind of the jury that a 
proposition is more probably true than not true. 
Therefore, if you believe that all the evidence is 
evenly balanced, you will reject the propositions 
advanced by defendant as to value, and as to 
damages, and will accept those advanced by 
plaintiff." 
We should also call this Court 's attention to the fact 
that no other instruction concerning the burden of proof 
was given by the trial court and may we also note that 
the respondents were permitted the right to open and 
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close in connection with the trial. "We submit that failure 
to give the requested instruction was fundamental error 
in this cause. 
5 Nichols on Eminent Domain, Section 18.5 at page 
198, states the rule as follows: 
" F r o m the rule that an award is vacated by ap-
peal and cannot be considered by the jury in 
determining damages, it follows that the burden 
of proof of establishing his right to substantial 
compensation is upon the owner, even if he is 
defendant or respondent in the proceedings, since 
it is clear (except in the states in which the jury 
or other tribunal are entitled to use their own 
knowledge of values, or a view of the premises is 
considered as evidence) that if no evidence were 
introduced by either party, the jury would have 
no basis upon which to fix the compensation and 
would be bound to award nominal damages only. 
Accordingly, it is the law in most jurisdictions 
that the burden of proof is upon the owner to 
establish his right to recover more than nominal 
damages even when his land is taken; and, when 
no land of his is taken, if he fails to prove that 
the fair market value of his land is perceptibly 
decreased by the laying out and construction of 
the improvement, he is not entitled even to nomi-
nal damages. When there is a partial taking of 
land, in the absence of proof by the owner of 
diminution in value of the remainder area, he is 
limited in his recovery to the value of the land 
, actually taken." 
This rule was explicitly followed in the case of 
Tanner v. Provo Bench Canal & Irrigation Co., 40 Utah 
105, 121 Pac. 584, wherein the Court said: 
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" I t is also contended that the burden of estab-
lishing the amount of damages was upon respon-
dent, and that in any event the court erred in per-
mitting him to enter upon appellants' property 
before he had established what was just compen-
sation for appellants' property taken or affected 
by his proposed improvement. We think, how-
ever, that, under the practice in force in this 
jurisdiction, the burden of establishing the quan-
tum of damages was upon the appellants. Such 
has always been, and continues to be, the practice 
in the district courts of this state. Moreover, such 
is the great weight of authority under statutes 
similar to ours. In 15 Cyc. 898, the prevailing rule 
upon this question is stated as follows: ' The bur-
den of showing necessity and public use is upon 
petitioner. The burden of showing the damages 
which the owner will suffer rests on him.' In 2 
Lewis, Eminent Domain (3d Ed.) § 645, the rule 
is stated to be in accordance with the text quoted 
from Cyc, and the author of LewTis' Eminent 
Domain, in part at least, collates the cases both 
for and against the rule as there stated. In addi-
tion to the numerous cases cited by Mr. Lewis, 
see, also, Monterey County v. Cushing, 83 Cal. 
507, 23 Pac. 700; Los Angeles County v. Reyes 
(Cal.) 32 Pac. 233, and cases there cited." 
This case was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the 
United States in 239 U.S. 323, 60 L.Ed. 307, and has ever 
since been the law in this jurisdiction and has been 
followed without question in every condemnation case 
that we have been able to examine. We submit that the 
requested instruction should have been given. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT VI. 
THAT THE COUBT IMPROPERLY ASSESSED IN-
TEREST AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF IN COMPUT-
ING THE AMOUNT OF THE JUDGMENT EN-
TERED ON THE VERDICT ON NOVEMBER 5, 1954. 
And finally we contend that the trial court erred in 
assessing interest in this cause. It will be remembered 
that this Court, in the case of State v. Peek, supra, held 
that interest was not recoverable in this type of condem-
nation proceeding until date of judgment and it is 
necessary to also note that the first judgment in this 
cause in the sum of $495,875.00 was entered on May 27, 
1952, but was not paid to the respondents until January 
5, 1953. 
Therefore, in the Judgment on the Verdict entered 
by the trial court on November 5, 1954 (R. 97-99) the 
following steps were taken by respondents with respect 
to interest. First, the verdict and judgment in this cause 
rendered by the jury on Nivember 5, 1954, in the total 
sum of $632,145.00, is related back to May 27, 1952, and 
interest on this full amount is charged to January 5, 
1953, at the rate of 8 percent per annum, or the sum of 
$31,888.09, and this is then added to the judgment. This 
total of $664,033.09 is then credited with the payment 
of $495,875.00, leaving a balance of $168,158.09; and this 
amount is then charged with 8 percent per annum interest 
computed to November 5, 1954, totalling $24,663.10, and 
this added to the remainder of $168,158.09 above, makes 
the total of $192,821.19 for which judgment has now been 
taken and entered. 
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Two questions present themselves: first, is it proper 
to relate the second judgment back to the first for the 
purpose of charging and collecting interest; and second, 
if it is proper to so relate the second judgment back, is 
it proper to charge interest at the rate of 8 percent per 
annum. 
The answer to the first question requires a further 
interpretation of this Court 's ruling in State v. Peek, 
supra, and of our statutes. I t is true that following the 
judgment entered on the first trial and its payment, a 
final order of condemnation was made and entered in 
favor of the State of Utah and it would be most difficult 
to now argue that this did not constitute " the actual 
t ak ing" of the property. However, in view of the com-
plex nature of this judgment, the positive and mandatory 
language of the statute that we have quoted on the first 
page of this brief and the fact that a state agency is 
involved, we have felt it to be the better practice to call 
the matter to this Court 's attention for their ruling on 
the matter. 
However, with respect to the second question, we are 
of the firm opinion that the Utah case of State v. Daniel-
son, 247 P. 2d 900, is controlling and that the interest on 
this second judgment as it exceeds the first judgment 
must be limited to 6 percent per annum until the actual 
entry of that judgment on November 5, 1954. That case 
held that interest at 6 percent per annum from the date 
of an order for immediate occupancy to the entry of final 
judgment was proper and we contend that the present 
situation is no different in principal. 
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CONCLUSION 
By way of summation, we are desirous of emphasiz-
ing that the verdict and judgment from which this appeal 
is taken gave to the Deere Estate the market value of 
their property, insured to them all of the profit they 
could possibly hope to realize from the individual sale 
of each lot in Parcel 1 thereof, no matter how long it 
might have taken to make those sales, and all of this 
without any cost or expense to them and assuredly there 
would have been some cost; and in addition they are 
also entitled to interest on the judgment, albeit that in-
terest did not commence to run for a period of slightly 
more than nine months after the commencement of the 
original condemnation action. Certainly the statutes do 
not contemplate in eminent domain proceedings that the 
State of Utah shall underwrite for each defendant an 
unearned profit. 
We respectfully submit that the appellant, State of 
Utah, is entitled to, and should be granted, a new trial 
of this cause. 
Eespectfully submitted, 
E. E. CALLISTEE 
Attorney General 
EOBEET B. POETEE 
Assistant Attorney General 
53 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
:T>-
, \ 
*-./ 7TX\ "\ \ ^ 
l A W LIBRARY 
B t f N DOCUMENT COUECIIOM 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
